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Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part III)?:
The Intentional Killing of Civilians under International
Humanitarian Law*
Samuel Estreicher"

Abstract
The overarching objective of the law of armed conflict, also called international
humanitarianlaw (IHL), is the minimization of harm to civilians during such conflicts. Yet,
at least in some circles, there is a reluctance to make evaluativejudgments about non-state
groups who, in a variety of contexts, intentionally target civilians as a tactic in pursuing their
political or military objectives. Sometimes, such non-state actors target civilians affiliated with
the enemy state simply as way of demoralizng or harming the enemy. In other situations, these
actors attack civilians living in the enemy state's (or a thirdparty state's) territory without
regard to whether they are citizens or otherwise affiliated with the enemy state. As is true with
regard to locating and deploying their military assets among dense civilian gatherings, the nonstate group'spurpose is to provoke a military responsefrom the enemy state that will result in
the death of civilians in the areas the non-state group controls or occupies; such deaths help
recmit new enlisteesfrom the outraged civilianpopulation, and stoke outcey from certain sectors
of the internationalcommunity.
The focus of thispaperis on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949the strongest, least debatable basis for applying certain IHL princiles to those who kil
noncombatants during internalarmed conflict. It seeks to demonstrate that Common Article 3
*

Copyright 0 2011-2012 Samuel Estreicher. All rights are reserved.
Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Co-Director, Opperrnan Institute for Judicial
Administration, New York University School of Law. This is the third of a three-part series under
the overall title, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare?: the first part, subtitled Defender Duties under
InternationalHumanitarian Law, was published in 11 Chi J Intl L 425 (2011); the second part,
subtitled The Proportionality'Prinble under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, was published in 12 Chi J
Intl L 143 (2011). The comments of my colleagues and friends Laurence Gold of Bredhoff &
Kaiser, Philip G. Alston, Jose Enrique Alvarez, Ryan Bubb, Ryan Goodman and Sam Rascoff of
NYU Law, Gabriella Blum of Harvard Law, Peter Margulies of Roger Williams University Law,
and Matt Waxman of Columbia Law, as well as the participants at the NYU Law Faculty
Workshop are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are my sole responsibility.

589

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

binds both the state and those seeking its violent overthrow. The bindingforce of Common
Article 3 flows both from the posiive premise that states can legislate on behalf of all those
within its territoU, even its armed opponents, andfrom thefact that Common Article 3 reflects
customay internationallaw.
This paper is a callfor moral and legal clarity. Politically inspired murder of civilians
during armed conflict is murder,pure and simple, and should be regardedas such by the world.
Such acts, whether they occur in interstate or wholly internalarmed conflicts, violate not only
the domestic law of the victim's state and of the state where the acts occur, but also violate wellestablished treaty and customay law. Murder of civilians is not a legitimate part of armed
struggle, and cannot be jusified by pleas of needing to right wrongs suffered at the hands of
other states, or equaliingthe balance offorces between the weak and the strong. The murderer
of civilians, like the pirate, slave trader,or torturer,merits the condemnation of all oTganized
sodety, of all mankind.
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I. A SIMPLE TRUTH
The overarching objective of the law of armed conflict, also called
international humanitarian law (IHL), is the minimization of harm to civilians
during such conflicts.' Yet, at least in some circles, there is a reluctance to make

I

Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recognizes that that
"civilians shall enjoy general protection against danger arising from military operations"; "shall
not be the object of attack"; and shall be free of "[i]ndiscriminate attacks." Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UN Treaty Set 3, 26 (1977) (API). Article 51.3 states that
these protections are afforded to civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities." Id. Whether this definition reflects customary international law and further issues
concerning the line between civilians and noncombatants are beyond the scope of this paper. See
generally Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpreive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Paricationin Hostilitiesunder InternationalHumanitarianLaw: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 NYU J
Intl L & Pol 637 (2010).
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evaluative judgments about non-state groups who, in a variety of contexts,
intentionally target civilians as a tactic in pursuing their political or military
objectives. Sometimes, such non-state actors target civilians affiliated with the
enemy state simply as a way of demoralizing or harming the enemy. In other
situations, these actors attack civilians living in the enemy state's (or a third party
state's) territory without regard to whether they are citizens or otherwise
affiliated with the enemy state.2 As is true with regard to locating and deploying
their military assets among dense civilian gatherings, the non-state group's
purpose is to provoke a military response from the enemy state that will result in
the death of civilians in the areas the non-state group controls or occupies. Such
deaths help recruit new enlistees from the outraged civilian population and stoke
outcry from certain sectors of the international community.
In an earlier article, I highlighted the duties of defenders to avoid locating
their military forces among civilians in view of the fact that the risk of harm to
civilians in armed conflicts is a joint product of what both defenders and
attackers do and has to be regulated as such.' In this article, I evaluate the status
under IHL of the intentional killing of civilians during armed conflicts.
It might appear that the thesis of this article is so incontestable that there is
no need to present it. Presumably, everyone knows that the intentional killing of
civilians, whether during an armed conflict or not, is morally reprehensible; and
if it occurs during a conflict between states or between a state and an armed
non-state group, it must also violate applicable international law. But, at least
with regard to non-state actors, this is often not the reaction, even among the
otherwise well-informed. In the early days after the attack on the US of
September 11, 2001, Stephen Jukes, then of the Reuters news service, declared
that Reuters would not use the word "terrorist" to describe the attackers,
repeating the old adage: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom
2

See, for example, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Midyear Report 2011: Protection
online
at
2011),
*1-2
(uly
Armed
Conflict,
Civilians
in
of
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/2011%/s20Midyear%20POC.pdf
(visited Oct 21, 2011) (UNAMA Midyear Report):
UNAMA documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the first six months of 2011....
The main trends that led to rising civilian casualties in early 2011 were
increased and widespread use of improvised explosive devices [(IEDs)], more
complex suicide attacks, an intensified campaign of targeted killings, increased
ground fighting, and a rise in civilian deaths from air strikes, particularly by
Apache helicopters. In total, 80 percent of all civilian deaths in the first half of
2011 were attributed to Anti-Government Elements .... IEDS and suicide
attacks, tactics used by Anti-Government Elements, accounted for nearly
half . .. of all civilian deaths and injuries.
See also Ray Rivera, Sharifullah Sahak and Eric Schmitt, Militants Turn to Death Squads in
Afghanistan, NY Times 1 (Nov 28, 2011).

3

Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties under International
HumanitarianLaw, 11 Chi J Intl L 425 (2011).
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fighter." 4 To avoid any perception of prejudging the morality or legality of the
non-state actor's intentional killing of civilians for political or military purposes,
the established media prefer to call the perpetrators "attackers," "militants,"
"insurgents" or (when they are committed to dying) "suicide bombers."
It is all very well to say that it depends on the operative definition whether
non-state groups or individuals that kill civilians for political or military purposes
are properly labeled "terrorists."' Whether that label fits is largely beside the

4

For a discussion of Jukes' internal memorandum, see Susan D. Moeller, A Moral Imagination: The
Media's Response to the War on Terrorism, in Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, eds, Reporing War:
journalism in Wartime 59, 68 (Routledge 2004). See also Reuters Handbook on Journasm 417 (Reuters
2008):
We may refer without attribution to terrorism and counter-terrorism in general
but do not refer to specific events as terrorism. Nor do we use the adjective
word terrorist without attribution to qualify specific individuals, groups or
events. Terrorism and terrorist must be retained when quoting someone in
direct speech. When quoting someone in indirect speech, care must be taken
with sentence structure to ensure it is entirely clear that they are the source's
words and not a label. Terrorism and terrorist should not be used as single
words in inverted commas (e.g. "terrorist") or preceded by so-called (e.g. a socalled terrorist attack) since that can be taken to imply a value judgment. Use a
fuller quote if necessary. Terror as in terror attack or terror cell should be
avoided, except in direct quotes.
Report the subjects of news stories objectively, their actions, identity and
background. Aim for a dispassionate use of language so that individuals,
organizations and governments can make their own judgment on the basis of
facts. Seek to use more specific terms like "bomber" or "bombing", "hijacker"
or "hijacking", "attacker" or "attacks", "gunman" or "gunmen" etc.

s

There is currently no universally accepted definition of terrorism; rather, there are about a dozen
anti-terrorism conventions which prohibit specific unlawful acts in particular contexts, such as
hostage-taking, sabotage of aircraft and ships, attacks at airports, and so on. See generally Michael
P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism As the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes:A Case of Too Much ConveTgence
between InternationalHumanitarianLaw andInternationalCiminalLaw?, 7 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 391,
392-93 (2001); Geoffrey Levitt, Is 'Terrorism" Wortb Defining?, 13 Ohio N U L Rev 97 (1986);
Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood Jr, Preliminary Thoughts towards an InternationalConvention
on Terrorism, 68 Am J Intl L 69 (1974). UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is an important
document in highlighting international concern and urging international cooperation to combat
terrorism. See UN Security Council Resolution 1373, UN Doc No S/RES/1373 (2001).
Unfortunately, it does not define the critical terms "terrorism" and "terrorist acts." See id.
US law defines the term "international terrorism" to reach violent acts that (1) would be unlawful
if committed in the US, (2) "appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping," and (3)
"occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum ..... 18 USC § 2331(1). For purposes
of the Secretary of State's reporting obligations, "terrorism" is defined as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents"; "international terrorism" is defined as "terrorism involving citizens or the
territory of more than 1 country . . . ." 22 USC 5 2656f(d)(1)-(2). The latter definition, less
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point. What is clear, however, is that the value-neutral terminology that is used
does not fit. Such non-state actors may as a matter of semantics be "attackers,"
"militants," "insurgents," or "bombers," but these terms are wholly inadequate.
These individuals or groups have intentionally killed noncombatants; they are
killers and murderers. Their intentional killing of noncombatants is not excused
by morality or (to be developed below) by international law, whether or not their
cause may one day prevail and the group on whose behalf they act may one day
receive some form of international recognition.6
These murderers stand condemned under the domestic law of the victim's
country, but often their acts are not likely, as a practical matter, to be judged
under that law. This result occurs because they operate from, or can readily
repair to, a territory that they or a state that gives them shelter controls.
International law provides a potent means for evaluating and judging such acts
during such conflicts.
The fact that these acts stand condemned under international law as well as
the domestic law of the victims' country, even where the acts are in furtherance
of an otherwise legitimate cause, also serves to undermine the claim that the
intentional killing of civilians during an armed conflict is somehow less
reprehensible than outright acts of murder. Mobilizing the moral educative force
of international law to delegitimize this tactic of warfare is critical to realizing the
underlying objective of IHL: minimizing harm to civilians during armed conflict.
The focus of this paper is on Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949-the strongest, least debatable basis for applying certain
IHL principles to those who kill noncombatants during internal armed conflict.
It seeks to demonstrate that Common Article 3 binds both a state and those
seeking its violent overthrow or other seditious object. The binding force of
Common Article 3 flows both from the positive premise that a state can legislate
on behalf of all those within its territory, even its armed opponents, and from
the fact that Common Article 3 reflects customary international law (CIL).

6

complicated than the former, comes close to the definition of "intentional killing of civilians"
used in this paper.
The laws of war at present do not recognize a "just war" principle that overrides legal (and moral)
strictures against the killing of civilians in armed conflict. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions has been criticized for introducing 'jus in bello" considerations in its express
inclusion of particular conflicts in defining "armed conflicts" (Art 1.4) and its broadening of the
concept of armed combatants (Art 44.3). See Estreicher, 11 Chi J Inti L at 429 & n 7 (2011). For a
discussion of the distinction between jus in bello andjus ad bellum, see Samuel Estreicher, Privileging
Asymmetric Warfare (PartII)?: The "Proportionality"Principle under InternationalHumanitarianLan, 12
Chi J Intl L 143, 147-50 (2011).
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II. ARE NON-STATE ACTORS BOUND BY IHL?
At one time it would have been difficult to find any basis in international
law to judge the acts of non-state actors. Traditionally, the principal office of
international law was to provide ground rules for interpreting treaties and
discerning rules of custom governing the relationships between states. Partly in
reaction to the atrocities committed during World War II and the immediate
postwar era, IHL, as embodied in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, assumed
some features of a regulatory regime-imposing obligations on states party that
do not depend on reciprocal actions by other states and that could not be
enforced by armed reprisals. Through Article 3, which is common to all four of
the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3), IHL further imposes obligations
on states and non-state actors engaged in conflicts internal to the state.
A. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
A truly remarkable advance in IHL, Common Article 3 provides in
pertinent part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture ....
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict.'
7

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 75 UN Treaty Set 135
(1950) (emphasis added). As President Reagan stated in his message of January 29, 1987, to the
US Senate transmitting Additional Protocol II of 1977, see note 9 below, which elaborates upon
Common Article 3: "This protocol makes clear that any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in
the course of a non-international armed conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a crime
against humanity, and is therefore also punishable as murder." Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflict, 100th Cong, 1st Sess
(1987), 26 ILM 561 (1987).
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While Common Article 3 does not define the term "armed conflict," the
scope of the term should be informed by the overall purpose of the provision,
which is to protect civilians during warfare between the state and armed nonstate opposition groups. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadid case stated: "an armed conflict exists whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State."' While the Tadid formulation is not perfect-it is not
clear why a "protracted" conflict is required in every instance-the ICTY is right
not to import into the definition of "armed conflict" any requirement that the
non-state opposition group must exercise effective control over a territory, a
requirement that does not seem relevant to the underlying offense.'
As the US Supreme Court has noted, Common Article 3 uses "[t]he term
'conflict not of an international character' . . . in contradistinction to a conflict
between nations."10 This provision applies "even if the relevant conflict is not

8

Prosecutor v Tadit, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY Oct 2, 1995), 35 ILM 32,
T 70 (1996).

9

In Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (AP II), which deals with
noninternational armed conflicts, the definition of "armed conflict" does contain such an
element. Article 1(1) provides that AP II reaches armed conflicts "which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed group which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Art 1, 1125 UN
Treaty Ser 609, 611 (1979) (AP II). Moreover, Article 1(2) states that AP II does not apply "to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." Id. See generally
Sandesh Sivakumaran, Identifying an Armed Conflict Not of an International Character,in Carsten Stahn
and Goran Sluiter, eds, The Emerging Practice of the InternationalCriminal Court 363 (Martinus Nijhoff
2009). Professor Sivakumaran maintains that the ICTY's practice is to apply the principles of AP
II while ignoring this threshold requirement. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the
InternationalLAw of InternalArmed Conlict, 22 Eur J Intl L 219, 254 (2011) ("Customary rules of
Additional Protocol II have been applied to all internal armed conflicts and not simply those
meeting the Additional Protocol II threshold."). On March 7, 2011, US Secretary of State of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the
Administration's intention to seek the Senate's advice and consent regarding ratification of AP II,
"which elaborates upon safeguards provided in Common Article 3 and includes more detailed
standards regarding fair treatment and fair trial." Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,
Reaffirming America's Commitment to Humane Treatment of Detainees, Press Statement, PRN 2011/343
(Mar 7, 2011). See also White House Press Office, New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Poliy
(Mar 7, 2011), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheetnew-actions-guantanamo-and-detainee-policy (visited Oct 15, 2011).
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 629 n 62 (2006), citing Jean S. Pictet, ed, Commentary on the III
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 37 (Intl Comm Red Cross 1960). For an

10
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one between signatories,"" and without regard to any principle of reciprocity. It
is generally agreed that the reference to "each Party to the conflict" is not limited
to "High Contracting Parties," given that the very purpose of the provision is to
deal with conflicts between a signatory and a non-state party occurring in the
territory of one of the signatories.12
How can a non-state group, especially a group committed to the military
overthrow of the authority of a signatory state, be bound by an agreement of
that state to an international convention? One answer often given lies in the
principle of legislative jurisdiction: the signatory state has authority to bind the
state and all who are within its territory." But that answer is not fully satisfying,
as it suggests one can be a responsible agent for one's armed adversary.
A more satisfactory answer might be found in the status of the
international law rule or principle in question. If the rule or principle is accepted
early assessment of the Hamdan ruling, see Samuel Estreicher and Diarmuid O'Scannlain,
Hamdans limits and the Miitag CommissionsAct, 23 Const Commentary 403 (2006).
11

12

13

Hamdan, 548 US at 629.
As a purely textual matter, conceivably a non-state group engaged in conflict with a High
Contracting Party might be regarded as a High Contracting Party once it becomes a state and
accedes to the Conventions; under this view, Common Article 3 would apply only after such an
accession occurred. This reading is difficult to square, however, with the penultimate paragraph of
the Article, which envisions "special agreements" between "[t]he Parties to the conflict" to bring
the Convention into force. It is also difficult to reconcile with the applicable commentary: Article
3 "applies to non-international conflicts only, and will be the only Article applicable to them until
such time as a special agreement between the Parties has brought into force between them all or
part of the other provisions of the Convention." Pictet, ed, Commenta on the III Geneva Convention
at 34 (cited in note 10). Consider also the attempted accession, in June, 1989, of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), on behalf of the Government of the State of Palestine, to the
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977. On September 13, 1989, the Swiss
Federal Council stated that it was not in a position to decide whether the PLO's letter constituted
an instrument of accession, "due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the
existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine." See Palestine and the Geneva Conventions, 30 Intl
Rev Red Cross 64, 64 (1990).
Jean Pictet's explanation seems to turn on the fact that the insurgent group seeks to represent the
same territory as the signatory state: "How could insurgents be legally bound by a Convention
which they had not themselves signed? But if the responsible authority at their head exercises
effective sovereignty, it is bound by the very fact that it claims to represent the country, or part of
the country. The 'authority' in question can only free itself from its obligations under the
Convention by following the procedure for denunciation laid down in Article 142." Pictet, ed,
Commentay on the III Geneva Convention at 37 (cited in note 10).
The relevant considerations here are ably assessed in Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obkgations of
Non-State Actors (Oxford 2006); Sandesh Sivakumaran, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, 55 Intl &
Comp L Q 369 (2006); Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountabity ofArmed Opposition Groups in International
Law (Cambridge 2002); Michael Bothe, War Cimes in Non-InternationalArmed Conlcts, in Yoram
Dinstein and Mala Tabory, eds, War Crimes in InternationalLaw 293, 302-03 (Martinus Nijhoff
1996); Yoram Dinstein, The InternationalLaw of Civil Wars and Human Rights, 6 Israel YB Hum Rts
62 (1976).
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as a matter of CIL, its binding force flows not from any exercise of putatively
delegated authority of a state to rule for its nationals and residents, but from the
settled expectations of the community of nations.14 Although custom is, at
bottom, also a product of state action, a CIL-based approach avoids the anomaly
of a state acting directly as an agent for its sworn enemy."
It is widely agreed that Common Article 3 reflects binding international
custom.' 6 Customary law is created by the interplay of two elements: (1) the
widespread opinion of the nation-states that they are bound by a particular rule
or principle as a matter of legal obligation (opinio juris); and (2) the concrete
reflection of this opinion in the practice of the states. The opinio juris element
would seem amply evidenced by the nearly universal accession of the world's
nations to the Geneva Conventions, including to Common Article 3.
International tribunals have recognized the provision's status as customary
law. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (JCJ) called
Common Article 3 "a minimum yardstick" reflecting "elementary considerations
of humanity."17 And in the Tadi6 case, the ICTY recognized that "Common
Article 3 contains . . . the substantive rules governing internal armed conflict";"
"customary law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of Common
Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and rules on the
protection of victims of internal armed conflict";' 9 and that:

14

I criticize the conceptual underpinnings of CIL in Rethinking the Binding Efect of Customa
InternationalLaw, but I take more of a realist perspective in A Post-FormationRight of Withdrawalfrom
Customary International Law?: Some Canionary Notes. Compare Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the
Binding Effect of Customary InternationalLaw, 44 Va J Intl L 5 (2003), with Samuel Estreicher, A PostFormation Rsght of Withdrawalfrom Customary International Law?: Some Cautionay Notes, 21 Duke J
Comp & Intl L 57 (2010).

15

Some non-state groups, though with a less-than-perfect record of adherence to Common Article
3, purport to obey aspects of the laws of war. See, for example, The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan:
The Layha [Code of Conduct]for Mujahids, 93 Intl Rev Red Cross 103, 107-08 (2011) (Intl Comm
Red Cross, trans), discussed in 2011 UNAMA Midyear Report at **v--vi (cited in note 2).

16

There is no reason to believe that recognition of the obligations of armed non-state groups to
adhere to the basic principles of Common Article 3 necessarily confers lawful combatant status
on those groups. Common Article 3 does not itself confer combatant immunity. See Jean S.
Pictet, ed, CommentaU on the I Geneva Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field at 50 (Common Article 3 "does not in any way limit the right of a
State to put down rebellion. Nor does it increase in the slightest the authority of the rebel party")
(Intl Comm Red Cross 1952).

17

Case ConcerningMilitay and ParamilitagAcivities in and Against Nicaragua(Nicarv US), 1986 ICJ 14, 1
218 (June 27, 1986), quoting Corfu Channel (UK v Alb), 1949 ICJ 4, 22 (Apr 9, 1949). The ICJ's
reasoning in Nicaragua regarding the customary status of Common Article 3 is challenged in
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as CustomaU Law, 81 Am J Intl L 348, 350-58 (1987).

18

Tadid, 35 ILM 32,

19

Id at

103 (cited in note 8).

134.
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[l]t cannot be denied that customary rules have developed to govern
internal strife. These rules . . . cover such areas as protection of civilians
from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate attacks . . . protection of

all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as
prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts
and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities. 20
To be sure, violations of Common Article 3 do not constitute a "grave
breach" under the Geneva Conventions; hence, states are under no obligation to
prosecute such violations. 21 However, such violations are plainly criminal
offenses under other international instruments. Thus, the Statute of the ICTY
treats the "willful killing" of persons protected under the Geneva Conventions
as a grave breach of those Conventions, in violation of Article 2 of the Statute,
and it regards "murder," "when committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population," as a "crime against humanity" in violation of Article 5 of the
Statute.22 Further, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), created to deal with genocide within the country, criminalizes violations
of Common Article 3.23
It is particularly telling that the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which has a broader jurisdiction than either the ICTY or
the ICTR, makes criminal "serious violations of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949," and includes, inter alia, the following
acts committed against noncombatants: "Violence to life and person, in

20

Id at

21

See Tadi, 35 ILM 32,

22
23

127. The Tadit opinion should be evaluated in light of Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTY,
which gives the ICTY authority "to prosecute persons violating the laws and customs of war."
See Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art 3
at
online
2009),
(Sept
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal/2OLibrary/Statute/statute-septO9_en.pdf (visited Sept 21,
2011) (compiling resolutions authorizing the ICTY). The Tribunal, in turn, has read Article 3 of
its Statute to incorporate, among other sources, "violations of common Article 3 and other
customary rules on internal conflicts." Tadid, 35 ILM 32, 89 (cited in note 8). See generally
Theodor Meron, The Coninuing Role of Custom in the Formationof InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 90
Am J Intl L 238 (1996).
79 (cited in note 8); Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibiiy
ofIndividualsforHuman Rights Abuses in InternalConflicts: A Positivist View, 93 Am J Intl L 302, 311
(1999) ("Mhe Geneva Conventions and [the 1977] Protocols I and II do not include violations of
common Article 3 (which deals with internal conflicts) in the regime of 'grave breaches."').
Updated Statute of the ICTY, Arts 2, 5 (cited in note 20).
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art 4, UN Security Council
Resolution 955, UN Doc S/Res/955, 33 ILM 1598 (1994). The offense here is separate from
Articles 2 and 3, which deal with genocide and crimes against humanity, respectively, and instead
includes, according to Article 4(a), "[vliolence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of
corporal punishment .... "
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particular murder of all kinds, mutilations, cruel treatment and torture ... .' 24
The related ICC Elements of Crimes sets forth in Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1 the war crime
of murder. The elements of this crime are:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were either hors de combat, or were civilians,
medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the
hostilities.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established
this status.
4. The conduct took place in the context and was associated with an armed
conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence of an armed conflict. 25
Not every violation of Common Article 3 is prosecutable. The institutional
capacity of the various international criminal tribunals necessarily limits
prosecutions to serious, systemic offenses. But the texts of the statutes
establishing the ICTY and ICTR, and of the Rome Statute, are sufficient in
themselves to provide evidence both of opinio juris and state practice. 26 1n Sum,
given the foregoing and the evidence of state practice applying international
humanitarian rules to internal conflicts, there is a more than sufficient basis to
brand the intentional killing of civilians by states and non-state actors during
armed conflicts as violations of international law.

25

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN, Art 8(2)(c), 2187 UN Treaty Ser 90, 37
(July 17, 1998). See generally Anthony Cullen, The Definition of Non-InternationalArmedConfct in the
Rome Statute of the InternationalCiminal Court:An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Containedin
Article 8(2)(), 12 J Conflict & Sec L 419 (2008).
Report of the PreparatoryCommissionfor the InternationalCriminalCourt:Addendum PartII Finafiked Draft

26

Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 at 37-38, Art 8(2)(c)(i)-1 (2000).
Similarly, the US regards the commission of murder during armed conflict by a member of the US
armed forces as a "grave breach of common Article 3" and a prosecutable "war crime." See 18
USC 5 2441(c)-(d). "Murder" is defined as follows: "The act of a person who intentionally kills,
or conspires or attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of
committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause." 18 USC 5 2441 (d)(1)(D).
See Simma and Paulus, 93 AmJ Intl L at 312-13 (cited in note 21) (citations omitted):

24

We know of no case in which a national, let alone an international, tribunal
prior to the ICTY's establishment has exercised jurisdiction over war crimes in
internal conflicts irrespective of the nationality of the victim and the
perpetrator. On the other hand, the Tribunals create further international
practice. Moreover, widespread acceptance of the jurisprudence of the
Tribunals represents evidence that the punishment of perpetrators of offenses
against international humanitarian law in internal offenses is nowadays
permitted by a general principle of law.
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B. Other Sources
It should be emphasized that Common Article 3 should be read together
with the remainder of the Geneva Conventions of which it is a part as well as
the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II (AP I and II). In particular, many of the
provisions of AP I, which is in terms limited to interstate armed conflicts, are
widely treated as reflecting CIL. A central provision is Article 51, which provides
in pertinent part:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to
this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable
rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians . .. without distinction. 27

Moreover, Article 75 of AP I, which the US (a non-signer of AP I) has
stated it will apply out of a "sense of legal obligation" and thus suggests may
reflect CIL, 28 lists "murder" as among the acts that "are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by
civilians or by military agents." 29
Article 51 principles of protecting civilians and adhering to the distinction
between civilians and combatants during armed conflicts and Article 75's
prohibition of murder of civilians during armed conflict "in any place

27

28

AP I, Art 51 (cited in note 1). Similarly, Art 13(2) of AP II states: "ftlhe civilian population as
such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." (cited in note 9).
See White House Press Office at *3 (cited in note 9). John Bellinger, the Bush Administration's
Legal Advisor to the State Department, believes the US and "other nations should apply Article
75 as a legal obligation in all conflicts." John B. Bellinger III and Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention

Operations in Contemporary Confets: FourChallengesfor the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,
29

105 Am J Ind L 201, 207 (2011).
AP I, Art 75.2 (cited in note 1).
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whatsoever" are widely recognized as reflecting customary law. In the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ stated in pertinent part:
78. The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of
humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of
the civilian population .. . and establishes the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the
object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.
79. It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human
person and "elementary considerations of humanity" . . . that the Hague and
Geneva Conventions have enjoyed broad accession. Further these
fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary law.30
Although the ICJ speaks in terms of the obligations of states, it does so to
identify customary rules binding on non-consenting states and non-state groups.
In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published
an extensive survey of state practices, finding that the principles of protecting
civilians and distinguishing between civilians and combatants are widely followed
as a matter of customary law, whether the conflict is international or wholly
internal in scope:
Military manuals which are applicable in or have been applied in noninternational armed conflicts specify that a distinction must be made
between combatants and civilians to the effect that only the former may be
targeted. To direct attacks against civilians in any armed conflict is an
offence under the legislation of numerous States.
No official contrary practice was found with respect to either international
or non-international armed conflicts. 31
The 2005 study has been properly criticized for undue reliance on opinio juris
but it is doubtful that as to these central principles there is any official contrary

practice.32
30

Legaity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ 226,

78-79 (July 8,

1996).
31

32

Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 1 Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw
6 (Cambridge 2005). See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds, 2 CustomaU
InternationalHumanitarianLaw Part 1 (Cambridge 2005); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on CustomaU
InternationalHumanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understandngand Respect for the Rule of Law in
Armed Conflict, 87 Intl Rev Red Cross 175 (2005).
For initial criticism of the ICRC study, see W. Hays Parks, The ICRC Customary Law Study: A
Prefiminary Assessment, 99 Am Socy Intl L Proc 208 (2005); Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal
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III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The following five concrete steps should be considered. These five steps
directly address the media and public perception of the killing of civilians. First,
in law-and to the extent law hopes to play a moral, educative role-it is
important that we call things by their proper name. The first step is intellectual
honesty. Whether one favors the merits of the underlying cause or not, the
intentional killing of civilians is a moral and legal wrong, and when it occurs, it
should be called murder, not militancy, not political agitation, not insurgency,
not attacks. It may in some sense be any or all of those things but it is, in its
relevant sense, murder, even if it is politically motivated murder.
Second, the international community has gone far in branding torture as an
intrangressible international wrong, an absolute wrong not admitting of any
justification. This branding occurred well before the widespread adoption of the
Convention against Torture.33 As one court noted, "the torturer has becomelike the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind."3 4 Like treatment has to be accorded to states and non-state
opposition groups that intentionally kill civilians in the course of armed strife.35
Third, the United States and like-minded countries should not limit their
reporting36 and moral suasion activities to "terrorism," a spectral term that has
defied international consensus.3 7 Although states may have their own reasons for
targeting terrorism, from the vantage of the overall objective of IHL the central
task is to minimize harm to civilians during armed conflicts. From this
standpoint, it is extraneous to ask whether the non-state group that targets
civilians as part of its armed campaign against the enemy also intends to spread

Adviser, US Dept of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, US Dept of Defense, to Dr.
Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC, Regarding Customary International Law Study (Nov 3,
2006), 46 ILM 514 (2007).
33

General Assembly Res No 39/46, UN Doc A/RES/39/46 (1984) (Convention against Torture).

34

Filaigav Pena-Irala,630 F2d 876, 890 (2d Cir 1980).

35

36

Although it could well qualify for such status, there is no need in the present context to decide
whether the intentional killing of civilians has been recognized as a "jus cogens" or peremptory
norm overriding contrary treaty provisions. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May
23, 1969), Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331, 344 (1980): "A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character."
The reporting mandate of the UNAMA is a good first step. See UNAMA Midyear Report at *5

37

See note 5.

(cited in note 2).
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terror or demoralize the enemy. Rather, we can safely assume they intend to
accomplish the likely consequences of their acts.
Fourth, states that provide refuge or a territorial base for non-state groups
that routinely violate Common Article 3 should be the subject of appropriate
sanctions.
Fifth, members of the UN Security Council and other states with
peacekeeping responsibility must always factor into their deliberations the needs
of international peace and order, which may require recognizing the claims of
non-state groups that emerge victorious in internal conflict, irrespective of
whether they have violated international norms. However, the quest for
recognition should turn not only on whether the group effectively controls its
territory and is capable of meeting future international obligations, but also on
its record in according human rights to persons under its control and in
respecting humanitarian law during the course of its struggle. If the overarching
objective of IHL is to minimize harm to civilians during armed conflict, the
international community has to cautiously consider those to whom it bestows
international legitimacy.3 9

IV. CONCLUSION
This paper is a call for moral and legal clarity. Politically inspired murder of
civilians during armed conflict is murder, pure and simple, and should be
regarded as such by the world. Such acts, whether they occur in interstate or
wholly internal armed conflicts, violate not only the domestic law of the victim's
state and of the state where the acts occur, but also well-established treaty and
customary law. Murder of civilians is not a legitimate part of armed struggle, and
cannot be justified by pleas of needing to right wrongs suffered at the hands of
other states, or equalizing the balance of forces between the weak and the
strong. The murderer of civilians, like the pirate, slave trader, or torturer, merits
the condemnation of all organized society, of all mankind.

38

See generally Tal Becker, Terrism and the State: Rethinking the Rules ofState Responsibiltiy (Hart 2006).

3

See generally Oona Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
InternationalLaw, 121 Yale LJ (2011) (forthcoming).
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